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Abstract
In mechanism design theory, a designer would like to implement a desired social
choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each possible profile of
agents’ types. To do so, the designer constructs a mechanism which describes each
agent’s feasible strategy set and the outcome function. Generally speaking, each
agent’s strategy in a mechanism has two possible formats: an action, or a message.
In this paper, we focus on the former format and claim that the notion of Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of a mechanism should be based on a profit function instead of the
conventional utility function when strategies of agents are costly actions. Next, we
derive the main result: Given a social choice function which can be implemented by
an indirect mechanism in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if all strategies of agents are
costly actions, then it cannot be inferred that there exists a direct mechanism that
can truthfully implement the social choice function in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Key words: Bayesian Nash Equilibrium; Mechanism design; Revelation Principle.
1 Introduction
In the framework of mechanism design theory [1,2,3,4], there are one designer
and some agents. 1 Suppose that the designer would like to implement a de-
sired social choice function which specifies her favorite outcome for each pos-
sible profile of agents’ types. However, each agent’s type is modelled as his
∗ Corresponding author.
Email address: 18621753457@163.com (Haoyang Wu).
1 The designer is denoted as “She”, and the agent is denoted as “He”.
private property and unknown to the designer. In order to implement a so-
cial choice function in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the designer constructs a
mechanism which specifies each agent’s feasible strategy set (i.e., the allowed
actions of each agent) and an outcome function (i.e., a rule for how agents’
actions get turned into a social choice).
Generally speaking, each agent’s strategy in a mechanism has two possible
formats: an action, or a message (i.e., a plan of action) (see MWG’s Book,
Page 883, Line 8, [1]). The distinction between the two formats is that: the
former format of strategy is a real action which naturally requires some action
cost to be performed realistically, whereas the latter format of strategy is a
message of action plan which is reported by each agent to the designer and
hence doesn’t need action cost to be performed realistically. In this paper, we
focus on the former format of strategy, and investigate the notion of Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of a mechanism.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we introduce a notion of profit func-
tion (i.e., Definition 1), and then claim that the definition of Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of a mechanism should be based on the profit function instead of
the conventional utility function when strategies of agents are costly actions
(i.e., Definition 2). Next, we derive the main result (i.e., Proposition 1): Given
a social choice function f which is implemented by an indirect mechanism in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, if all strategies of agents in the mechanism are
costly actions, then it cannot be inferred that there exists a direct mecha-
nism that can truthfully implement f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Section
3 concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical Analysis
Consider a setting with one designer and I agents indexed by i = 1, · · · , I.
Each agent i privately observes his type θi that determines his preference
over elements in an outcome set X . The set of possible types for agent i is
denoted as Θi. The vector of agents’ types θ = (θ1, · · · , θI) is drawn from set
Θ = (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI) according to probability density φ(·), and each agent i’s
utility function over the outcome x ∈ X given his type θi is a two-parameter
function ui(x, θi).
A mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) is a collection of I strategy sets S1, · · · , SI
and an outcome function g : S1 × · · · × SI → X . The mechanism combined
with possible types (Θ1, · · · ,ΘI), the probability density φ(·) over the possible
realizations of θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · × ΘI , and utility functions (u1, · · · , uI) defines
a Bayesian game of incomplete information. The strategy function of each
agent i in the game induced by Γ is a private function si(·) : Θi → Si. Each
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strategy set Si contains agent i’s possible strategies (i.e., actions, or plans of
action). The outcome function g(·) describes the rule for how agents’ strategies
get turned into a social choice. A social choice function (SCF) is a function
f : Θ1 × · · · × ΘI → X that, for each possible profile of the agents’ types
θ1, · · · , θI , assigns a collective choice f(θ1, · · · , θI) ∈ X .
Note 1: As shown above, there are two possible formats of each agent’s strat-
egy in the mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)): an action, or a message.
1) If each agent’s strategy is an action, then it should be performed realis-
tically. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that each agent shall spend some
action cost (or make some effort which can be quantified as some action cost)
to perform his strategy.
2) If each agent’s strategy is a message, then it is not a real action and hence
doesn’t need action cost to be performed realistically. ✷
In the following discussions, we will focus on the former format of strategy and
investigate the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism. To sim-
plify representations, we assume that each agent’s action cost is only relevant
to his strategy and private type, and is independent of the game outcome. 2
Definition 1: Given a social choice function f , consider a mechanism Γ =
(S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. For each
agent i with private type θi, if his strategy si(θi) : Θi → Si in the game induced
by Γ is a costly action, then the corresponding action cost is defined by a cost
function ci(si, θi) : Si ×Θi → R
+, i.e., ci(si, θi) > 0 for each si ∈ Si, θi ∈ Θi.
Suppose the outcome yielded by Γ is denoted as x = g(s1, · · · , sI) ∈ X and
agent i’s utility is denoted by a two-parameter function ui(x, θi) : X × Θi →
R, then each agent i’s profit is defined by a three-parameter profit function
pi(x, si, θi) : X × Si ×Θi → R, and
pi(x, si, θi) = ui(x, θi)− ci(si, θi). (1)
Discussion 1: Someone may argue that when each agent’s strategy is a costly
action, then his utility has already included the action cost. Thus, it is not
necessary to introduce another notion of profit function to make confusion.
Answer 1: Generally speaking, there are two versions of utility functions
which are commonly used in the literature of game theory and mechanism
design:
1) Version 1 : The utility function of an agent has a parameter which corre-
sponds to the agent’s strategy. For example, in Section 13.C of MWG’s book
(Page 450, the fourth line from the bottom, [1]), the authors use a three-
parameter function u(w, e|θ) = w − c(e, θ) to denote the utility of a type θ
2 This assumption can be relaxed without changing the following results.
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agent who plays the strategy e (i.e., the education level) and receives an out-
come w (i.e., the wage), where c(e, θ) denotes the agent’s cost of obtaining
education level e. 3 Obviously, the utility function which has a parameter of
agent’s strategy has already included agent’s cost, and indeed is equivalent to
agent’s profit function.
2) Version 2 : The utility function of an agent does not have any parameter
which corresponds to the agent’s strategy. For example, in Section 23.B of
MWG’s book (Page 858, the fifth line from the bottom, [1]), the authors use
a two-parameter function ui(x, θi) to denote the utility of agent i with type
θi after obtaining an outcome x ∈ X . Obviously, the utility function without
having a parameter of agent’s strategy only describes the agent’s utility with
respect to the outcome, and does not include the action cost spent by the agent
to obtain the outcome. Hence, when each agent’s strategy is a costly action,
the second version of utility function should be replaced by the profit function
to exactly describe how much each agent benefits from the game induced by
a mechanism. ✷
Now let us consider the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism.
Conventionally, a strategy profile s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s
∗
I
(·)) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) if, for all i and all θi ∈ Θi,
sˆi ∈ Si, there exists
Eθ
−i
[ui(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(g(sˆi, s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)|θi]. (2)
Note 2: As shown above, the conventional notion of Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium of a mechanism is based on a two-parameter utility function ui(x, θi) :
X × Θi → R, i.e., the second version of utility function. It should be em-
phasized that the strategies s∗
i
, s∗
−i
, sˆi appeared in formula (2) are only used
to compute an outcome x = g(·) ∈ X , and do not act as independent pa-
rameters of agent i’s utility function. When each agent i’s strategy si(θi) in
the mechanism Γ is a costly action, i.e., ci(si, θi) > 0, then as pointed out
in Answer 1, the two-parameter utility function ui(x, θi) cannot describe his
profit. Since it is the profit that each rational agent really concerns in a game,
the profit function should be introduced in the definition of the Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of a mechanism. 4
3 Another example can be seen in Section 14.B (Page 480, Line 1, [1]). The authors
use a two-parameter function u(w, e) = v(w) − g(e) to denote the utility of agent
who chooses the strategy e (i.e., the education level) and receive the outcome w
(i.e., the wage). Here in the definition of utility function u(w, e), the parameter of
agent’s type is omitted, and g(e) denotes agent’s cost with respect to e.
4 In some limited cases, each agent’s action cost may be neglected. By Eq (1)
the two-parameter utility function ui(x, θi) is equivalent to the three-parameter
profit function pi(x, si, θi). Therefore, the conventional definition of Bayesian Nash
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Definition 2: The strategy profile s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s
∗
I
(·)) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) if, for all i and all θi ∈ Θi,
there exists
Eθ
−i
[pi(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), s
∗
i
(θi), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[pi(g(sˆi, s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), sˆi, θi)|θi]
(3)
i.e.,
Eθ
−i
[(ui(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)− ci(s
∗
i
(θi), θi))|θi] ≥
Eθ
−i
[(ui(g(sˆi, s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)− ci(sˆi, θi))|θi],
for all sˆi ∈ Si, in which pi is the profit of agent i given by Eq (1).
According to MWG book [1], the mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) imple-
ments the social choice function f(·) in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ, s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s
∗
I
(·)), such that g(s∗(θ)) =
f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ. A direct mechanism is a mechanism Γ¯ = (S¯1, · · · , S¯I , g¯(·))
in which S¯i = Θi for all i and g¯(θ) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ1×· · ·×ΘI .
5 The social
choice function f(·) is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
(or Bayesian incentive compatible) if s¯∗
i
(θi) = θi for all θi ∈ Θi and i = 1, · · · , I
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct mechanism Γ¯ = (S¯1, · · · , S¯I , g¯(·)),
in which S¯i = Θi, g¯ = f . That is, if for all i = 1, · · · , I and all θi ∈ Θi, θˆi ∈ Θi,
there exists
Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[ui(f(θˆi, θ−i), θi)|θi]. (4)
Note 3: In the direct mechanism Γ¯ = (S¯1, · · · , S¯I , g¯(·)), each agent i indepen-
dently chooses his report strategy s¯i(·) : Θi → Θi, and the report type s¯i(θi)
does not need to be his true type θi. Hence, the format of each agent i’s strat-
egy is not a real action but a message. By Note 1, it is reasonable to assume
each agent i plays his strategy costlessly. 6 Thus, by Eq (1), each agent’s util-
ity in the direct mechanism is just equal to his profit. Consequently, although
the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a mechanism should be revised
to Definition 2 when strategies of agents are costly actions, the conventional
notion of Bayesian incentive compatibility still holds as specified by formula
(4).
equilibrium of a mechanism based on the second version of utility function holds
only in these limited cases.
5 Here we use a bar symbol to distinguish a direct mechanism from an indirect
mechanism.
6 Some researchers investigated misreporting costs in a direct mechanism [5,6],
which are possibly spent by agents when reporting a false type. However, the mis-
reporting cost is irrelevant to this paper. Our result holds no matter whether there
exists the misreporting cost or not. Hence, we simply omit the misreporting cost in
this paper.
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Note 4: In the direct mechanism Γ¯ = (S¯1, · · · , S¯I , g¯(·)), the only thing that
the designer gets from each agent i is the report type s¯i ∈ Θi, and she has
no way to verify whether these reports are truthful or not. All that the de-
signer can do is to announce f(s¯1, · · · , s¯I) as the outcome. Thus, in the direct
mechanism Γ¯, each agent i with type θi does not need to perform any other
strategy si(θi) ∈ Si specified in any indirect mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)),
and consequently does not need to spend any action cost. 7
Proposition 1: For a given social choice function f , suppose that there exists
an indirect mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that implements it in Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. For each agent with type θi, if his strategy si ∈ Si is a costly
action, i.e., ci(si, θi) > 0, then it cannot be inferred that there exists a direct
mechanism that can truthfully implement f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the social choice function f , and the indirect mechanism Γ =
(S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that implements it in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there
exists a profile of strategies s∗(·) = (s∗1(·), · · · , s
∗
I
(·)) such that the mapping
g(s∗(·)) : Θ1×· · ·×ΘI → X from a vector of agents’ types θ = (θ1, · · · , θI) into
an outcome g(s∗(θ)) is equal to the desired outcome f(θ), i.e., g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ)
for all θ ∈ Θ1 × · · · ×ΘI .
By Definition 2, for all i and all θi ∈ Θi, sˆi ∈ Si,
Eθ
−i
[(ui(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)− ci(s
∗
i
(θi), θi))|θi] ≥
Eθ
−i
[(ui(g(sˆi, s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)− ci(sˆi, θi))|θi].
Thus, for all i and all θi ∈ Θi, θˆi ∈ Θi,
Eθ
−i
[(ui(g(s
∗
i
(θi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)− ci(s
∗
i
(θi), θi))|θi] ≥
Eθ
−i
[(ui(g(s
∗
i
(θˆi), s
∗
−i
(θ−i)), θi)− ci(s
∗
i
(θˆi), θi))|θi].
Since g(s∗(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ, then for all i and all θi ∈ Θi, θˆi ∈ Θi,
Eθ
−i
[(ui(f(θi, θ−i), θi)−ci(s
∗
i
(θi), θi))|θi] ≥ Eθ
−i
[(ui(f(θˆi, θ−i), θi)−ci(s
∗
i
(θˆi), θi))|θi].
Note that the above inequality cannot infer the formula (4). Consequently, it
cannot be inferred that there exists a direct mechanism that can truthfully
implement f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. ✷
7 Someone may argue that in a direct mechanism Γ¯ = (S¯1, · · · , S¯I , g¯(·)), in addition
to choose a type s¯i ∈ Θi to report, each agent with type θi may also be willing
to perform another action si(θi) voluntarily as what he would perform in some
indirect mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)). Thus, each agent i also spends action
cost ci(si, θi) in the direct mechanism Γ¯. However, this argument requires each
agent to do beyond the framework of the direct mechanism, since the additional
strategy si(θi) ∈ Si is meaningless and not defined in the direct mechanism Γ¯.
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Discussion 2: Someone may disagree with Note 4 and Proposition 1, and
propose a “direct revelation game” as follows. For a given social choice func-
tion f , suppose there is an indirect mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)) that
implements f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and the equilibrium strategy is
s∗ = (s∗1, · · · , s
∗
I
). Consider this equilibrium, there is a mapping from vectors
of agents’ types into outcomes. Now we take the mapping to be a revelation
game, i.e., each agent i with private type θi independently chooses a type
θˆi ∈ Θi to report to the designer, and the designer suggests each agent an
action s∗
i
(θˆi) ∈ Si. Then no type of any agent can benefit by reporting a false
type θˆi 6= θi and performing the suggested action s
∗
i
(θˆi). As a result, truth-
telling is the equilibrium strategy of this game, i.e., each agent i reports his
true type θi and performs the strategy action s
∗
i
(θi), the same as what he
would perform in the indirect mechanism Γ.
Answer 2: It should be noted that in the direct revelation game, each agent
i with private type θi can choose any type θˆi ∈ Θi arbitrarily to report to
the designer, which means that the corresponding suggestion s∗
i
(θˆi) ∈ Si is
not restricted to be s∗
i
(θi). Thus, after the designer receives a report profile
(θˆ1, · · · , θˆI), in order to exactly know which s
∗
i
(θˆi) should be suggested to each
agent i, the designer must know each agent i’s strategy function s∗
i
(·) : Θi → Si
which is specified in an indirect mechanism Γ = (S1, · · · , SI , g(·)). However, in
the framework of mechanism design, the designer is always at the information
disadvantage in a mechanism: she never knows each agent i’s private type θi,
nor his private strategy function s∗
i
(·) : Θi → Si.
8 Therefore, the so-called
direct revelation game does not hold. ✷
3 Conclusion
This paper mainly investigates the notion of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of
a mechanism when strategies of agents are costly actions. The work is also
relevant to the possible failure of revelation principle. So far, there have been
several discussions on possible failures of the revelation principle: Kephart and
Conitzer [6] proposed that when reporting truthfully is costless and misreport-
ing is costly, the revelation principle can fail to hold. Bester and Strausz [7]
pointed out that the revelation principle may fail because of imperfect com-
mitment.
This paper proposes that when strategies of agents in an indirect mechanism
8 Otherwise, assume to the contrary that the designer knows each agent i’s strategy
function s∗
i
(·) : Θi → Si, then she can easily infer each agent i’s private type θi from
his report s∗
i
(θi). Obviously, it contradicts the basic framework of mechanism design
and does not hold.
7
are costly actions, the definition of Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the mecha-
nism should be based on a profit function rather than the conventional utility
function which does not include a parameter of agent’s strategy. This is the
key point why the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium may fail,
and this failure is different from the above-mentioned possible failures of the
revelation principle.
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